



Witnesses' failure to detect covert manipulations in
their written statements
Citation for published version (APA):
Sagana, A., Sauerland, M., & Merckelbach, H. (2017). Witnesses' failure to detect covert manipulations in
their written statements. Journal of Investigative Psychology and Offender Profiling, 14(3), 320–331.
https://doi.org/10.1002/jip.1479





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 03 Nov. 2021
Received: 4 May 2016 Revised: 3 February 2017 Accepted: 2 March 2017
DOI: 10.1002/jip.1479R E S E A R CH AR T I C L EWitnesses' failure to detect covert manipulations
in their written statements
Anna Sagana | Melanie Sauerland | Harald MerckelbachForensic Psychology Section, Department of
Clinical Psychological Science, Faculty of
Psychology and Neuroscience, Maastricht
University, Maastricht, the Netherlands
Correspondence
Anna Sagana, Forensic Psychology Section,
Department of Clinical Psychological Science,
Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience,
Maastricht University, PO Box 616, 6200 MD
Maastricht, the Netherlands.
Email: anna.sagana@maastrichtuniversity.nl- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
320 wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/jipAbstract
Law enforcement agencies and legal professionals often have to rely
on witness statements. Undetected errors in witnesses' statements,
however, could impede the accurate reconstruction of a crime and
lead to the incrimination of innocent suspects. Here, we examined
whether witnesses can detect manipulations in their written state-
ments. We expect that writing a statement could provide a good
means for discrimination between what is truly recalled and what
is an error. This is because writing allows to monitor and control
the previously produced information. In 3 experiments, participants
watched a mock crime film and subsequently provided a written
statement of what they had witnessed. Following a delay of several
minutes (Experiment 1), 48 hr (Experiment 2), or 1 month
(Experiment 3), participants were exposed to and interviewed about
their testimony. Unknown to them, they were confronted with
statements, which included 4 secretly manipulated details.
Participants' missed a substantial number of manipulations in their
written statements. Importantly, the detection rates varied as a
function of delay (Experiments 1 and 2: 74–89%; Experiment 3:
36%–52%). Detection rates also varied as a function of the type
of details that were manipulated. Our findings indicate that writing
a statement comes with limited benefits in witnesses' ability to
detect errors in their statements.
KEYWORDS
choice blindness, interrogation protocol, misinformation, source
monitoring, witness statements1 | INTRODUCTION
When investigating crimes, police sometimes resort to techniques such as changing or omitting details fromwitnesses'
statements to elicit a confession (Pearse & Gudjonsson, 1999). However, few studies to date have attempted to
directly manipulate participants' statements (Christianson, Engelberg, & Gustafson, 2007; van Bergen, Horselenberg,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
J Investig Psychol Offender Profil. 2017;14:320–331.
SAGANA ET AL. 321Merckelbach, Jelicic, & Beckers, 2010). In fact, much of the current literature on the misinformation effect employs
the typical paradigm in which the misleading information is provided via another person's narrative of the event.
One disadvantage of this approach is that the misleading information is often not tailored to the memory of the par-
ticipant. As a consequence, participants may fail to detect the misinformation because it refers to a detail that was
never encoded in the first place (Lindsay, 1993; McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985). Furthermore, detecting misinformation
in others' accounts is substantially different from detecting changes in one's own statement. Participants often report
the misleading information because they are more trusting to the external source than to their own memory (Mazzoni,
1998; Wright & Livingston‐Raper, 2002). They assume the source of the misleading information to be more valid than
the information they remember as part of the original event. Additionally, providing a statement requires witnesses to
deliberate and evaluate the strength of their memory in an attempt to decide which details they should report
(Goldsmith, Koriat, &Weinberg‐Eliezer, 2002). Thus, to report a detail, the representation of the source should be rea-
sonably strong and meet a certain degree of conviction. For these reasons, it could be argued that in the case of their
own testimony, witnesses should be able to detect manipulations in their statements.
Findings by Christianson et al. (Experiment 1; 2007), however, suggest that witnesses accept unreported details as
their own testimony, even when they are instructed to search actively for errors. In their study, participants were
questioned about a mock crime. Whilst transcribing the statements, the experimenter made six changes to the original
report. Participants were then asked to inspect the statements for mistakes either by listening to the experimenter read-
ing the statement or by reading the statement out loud themselves. Participants' performance was far from ideal. Though
the ability to detect unreported details was above chance level when participants read the statement themselves (detec-
tion rate: 71.6%), the detection rate was as low as 15% when participants listened to the statement being read to them.
Likewise, van Bergen et al. (2010), who examined the acceptance of misinformation in one's transcribed statement,
found that individuals accept not only changes in the previously reported information but also additions of completely
new elements (detection rates ranging from 27.5%–55.0%). Furthermore, the longer time interval between providing a
statement and presenting the transcribed version (1 day vs. 2 weeks) promoted the acceptance of misinformation.
Although the findings regarding the ability of participants to detect changes in their testimony appear to be
robust, there is a certain lack of attempts aiming to extend the findings beyond verbal and later transcribed state-
ments. For instance, studies on the accuracy of autobiographical memories written down as diary entries suggest that
participants tend to accept manipulated diary fragments as genuine autobiographical memories (Merckelbach, Wessel,
& Horselenberg, 1997). However, these results were obtained in the context of diaries where participants write down
diary entries about memorable, yet mundane activities. Hence, the acceptance of manipulated fragments might reflect
the liberal recognition thresholds that people rely on in this setting. On the other hand, there are findings indicating
that written recall is associated with the creation of fewer false memories than verbal recall (Kellogg, 2001; Smith
& Hunt, 1998). That is because writing is a relatively slow process where the ideas have to be stored whereas the gra-
phemic representations for spelling words are activated (Kellogg, 2007), allowing for monitoring and control over the
previously produced information (Grabowski, 2007). Moreover, the visual record of the written recall should offer
retrieval cues that benefit long‐term performance (Kellogg, 2007). For these reasons, writing a statement should pro-
vide effective means to discriminate between originally recalled and externally derived information (e.g., information
provided by the interviewer). Therefore, more conceptual replications are necessary before we can postulate that the
effect extends beyond transcribed statements in the eyewitness context.
With these considerations in mind, the aim of the present study was to examine to what extent participants
detect manipulations in their written statements for a variety of retention intervals. The consideration of various time
intervals stems from the observation that in real cases, witnesses may be confronted with their statements in court,
often months or even years after providing the statement. Extensive research indicates that the longer the time inter-
val between misinformation and the target event, the stronger is the effect of the misinformation (Belli, Windschitl,
McCarthy, & Winfrey, 1992; Frost, Ingraham, & Wilson, 2002; Higham, 1998; Loftus, 2005; Underwood & Pezdek,
1998). According to the source monitoring framework (SMF; for a review, see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay,
1993), the increased acceptance of misinformation for longer time intervals can be explained by the fact that the cues
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inserted misinformation) fade over time. Hence, source misattributions become more likely. Drawing from these find-
ings, we expected that participants would be less able to detect manipulations in their statements when the intervals
between giving testimony and the presentation of the manipulated statement are longer than when the intervals are
shorter. Accordingly, we performed three experiments in which participants first provided a written statement and
were later interviewed about it. During the interview, participants were confronted with statements that included
up to four covertly manipulated details. The procedure was similar across experiments except that the confrontation
with the manipulated statement occurred several minutes (Experiment 1), 48 hr (Experiment 2), or 1 month
(Experiment 3) after giving testimony.
The failure of witnesses to detect manipulations in their statements can have serious consequences for legal deci-
sion making. Undetected manipulations in official legal witness documents could compromise the accurate recon-
struction of a criminal act. Such undetected errors could cause ambiguity about the sequence of events or the key
features of the perpetrator, affect other pieces of evidence, and possibly lead to an innocent suspect being incrimi-
nated. The undetected errors could bias the police by blinding them to evidence inconsistent with these errors whilst
heightening their awareness towards cues that support the erroneous statement. Consequently, important physical
evidence may be lost, police investigation could be delayed, and the discovered evidence could be corrupted (for sim-
ilar findings regarding confessions, see Hasel & Kassin, 2009). The judges and the jury, who often assume indepen-
dence of evidence, might be disproportionally affected in their decision making by the intertwined, corrupted
evidence. Finally, when presented in court, the manipulated statement could alternate the true memory of the wit-
ness, bolstering the negative consequences of the error. If written statements could provide good means for discrim-
ination between what is truly recalled and what is an error, investigators might want to reconsider the procedure by
which they obtain statements.2 | METHOD
The testing materials and procedure were largely analogous across experiments, with the exception of the retention
interval (henceforth delay) between providing the statement and being presented with the manipulated version.
Delays varied between several minutes (i.e., <30 min, Experiment 1), 48 hr (Experiment 2), and 1 month (Experiment
3). Note that the studies were planned and executed sequentially, with knowledge of the prior results when
performing the later experiments. All three studies were approved by the standing ethical board of the faculty.
2.1 | Participants
In Experiments 1 and 2, participants were 29 and 40 (22 men, Mage = 21.2 years, SDage = 3.2, age range: 18–41)
students of German (n = 35) and Dutch (n = 34) origin. Participants were Bachelor students at the faculty of
Psychology and Neuroscience (92.8%) or other faculties (7.2%). In Experiment 3, participants were 32 Germans (6
men, Mage = 21.1 years, SDage = 2.9, age range: 18–30). All were Bachelor students at the faculty of Psychology
and Neuroscience (93.5%), except for two individuals who were working in the private sector. Participation was
voluntary in exchange for course credit or a gift certificate. All participants were naïve to the purpose of the study
and were tested individually in their native language.
2.2 | Materials
2.2.1 | Stimulus film
A film fragment depicting a staged assault attempt was displayed on a computer screen with a resolution of
768 × 1024 pixels. The duration of the fragment was 2 min 43 s and comprised the following plot: A young red‐haired
woman with a fuller figure (i.e., the victim) walks down the road with two friends (bystanders) who are pushing their
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at a bus station where a young man with a fuller figure and black hair (i.e., the perpetrator) is sitting on a bench. After
the victim tells her friends that the bus she has to catch should arrive within minutes, the bystanders ride away. On
their departure, the perpetrator approaches the victim and invites her out for a drink. Her negative response turns
the perpetrator violent. He grabs and then pushes the victim into the bus stop. The victim manages to escape and runs
away entering a park behind the bus stop. However, the perpetrator catches up with her and here the fragment ends.
2.2.2 | Manipulations
The four performed manipulations referred to persons, actions, and location details. Our a priori selection of the
details was based on a pilot study with 21 participants (4 men, Mage = 27.0, SDage = 11.7, age range: 21–53) in which
we looked at the frequency with which event details were provided in participants' free recall. These selected details
and their report frequency can be found in Table 1. Because not all participants reported the preselected details in
their free reports, the a priori selection of the details to be manipulated resulted in loss of data points. We decided
not to deviate from the selected items (i.e., by manipulating different ones ad hoc) because this would have introduced
variation in the manipulated details, complicating interpretation of the results. We also did not add details into partic-
ipants' statements.
2.2.3 | Posttest questionnaire
The posttest questionnaire aimed to assess whether participants had noticed the manipulations in their statements
but were reluctant to reveal them during the interview. First, participants were asked three open‐ended questions
as to whether they had noticed any problems or anything strange during the experiment. Then, they were
misinformed that the study employed two conditions: an experimental condition where some details in participants'
statements had been manipulated and a control condition where no manipulations had been made. Participants had
to indicate in which condition they thought they had been assigned to. If they thought they had been in the experi-
mental condition, they had to specify which details they believed had been manipulated. If these responses were cor-
rect, they were counted as retrospective detection.2.3 | Design
We employed a within‐subjects design with detail type (person, action, and location) as the independent variable.
Concurrent and retrospective detections served as the dependent variables. Concurrent detection occurs when con-
cerns about the integrity of statement details are raised at the time of presentation (i.e., whilst reading the statement
or during the interview). Retrospective detection includes instances of suspicion that are expressed after the interview
in the posttest questionnaire. Overall detection rate includes concurrent and retrospective detections. If participants
indicated manipulations that had not occurred, no detection was assumed. Finally, the memorability of the details was
assessed by coding the accuracy (accurate vs. inaccurate) of the later to‐be‐manipulated details in participants'
reports.TABLE 1 Frequencies of reported details based on a pilot study
Manipulated detail Alteration category M (%) 95% CI
1 The hair of the female bystander were red Person 43.0 24.2–63.5
2 The figure of the victim was normal Person 66.0 45.4–82.8
3 Perpetrator pushed the victim to the ground Action 71.0 50.0–86.2
4 The surrounding was a parking lot Location 33.0 17.2–54.6
5 The bystanders walked away with their bikes Action 80.0 60.0–92.9
Note. Detail 5 was manipulated only in Experiment 3, in exchange of detail 4. CI = confidence interval.
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The experiment consisted of two parts. In part 1, participants provided a witness statement. In part 2, they were
interviewed about 10 details in their statements, four of which (at a maximum) had been manipulated. The purpose
of the interview was to examine whether participants would raise concerns about the accuracy of the statement when
their attention was pointed to specific details. A cover story indicating that the study investigated the link between
personality and memory was used to mask the real purpose of the study.
During the first part, after signing the informed consent form, participants watched the stimulus film and then
filled out personality questionnaires as a filler task. Next to allowing for a time interval between the film and preparing
the statement, the filler task served to strengthen the credibility of our cover story. No time limit was imposed for the
filler task. Hereafter, participants of all three Experiments were given unlimited time to provide a free report about the
witnessed crime. They were instructed to follow the chronological sequence of the events and to describe all people
involved in the film. Furthermore, they were discouraged from guessing about details they could not remember
(Gabbert, Hope, & Fisher, 2009; Hastie, Landsman, & Loftus, 1978). Participants typed their statement in a text file,
saved it in a designated computer folder, and then printed the statement. This procedure was followed to give partic-
ipants the impression that they had control over their statement. Finally, participants either continued with a working
memory computer task (Experiment 1) or were thanked and dismissed (Experiment 2 or 3).
In Experiment 1, whilst participants were busy with the computer task, the experimenter covertly accessed the
digital file with their statements from another computer and manipulated the critical details as described above. Then
she or he printed and saved the manipulated version of the statement in the same location and with the same name as
the original one. In Experiments 2 and 3, the same procedure was followed after participants had left the lab.
Part 2 took place on completion of the computer task (<30 min) for participants in Experiment 1, and participants
returned to the lab 48 hr later in Experiment 2 and 1 month (Mdays = 28.7, SDdays = 1.6) later in Experiment 3. In
Experiment 3, we allowed a deviation of 2 days to accommodate participants' classes and weekends.
The interview started with the experimenter instructing participants to open their statement on the computer
screen and handing them the manipulated printed version. Participants were first asked to read their statement as
a reminder. Subsequently, the experimenter inquired about the four manipulated (e.g., “In your statement you
mention that the victim was of normal weight. Can you estimate her weight in kg?”) and six nonmanipulated details
(e.g., “According to your description the perpetrator started talking to the victim. What was the content of the
conversation?” and “You mention that the victim wore a pink coloured jacket. Were there any prints on the jacket?”).
Similar to the four manipulated details, the six nonmanipulated details referred to persons, actions, and location
details. If participants had not mentioned the detail in their original statement, no manipulation was performed. How-
ever, to keep the length and the content of the interview constant across participants, the interviewer formulated a
question related to the nonreported detail in general terms (e.g., “Could you estimate the height and the weight of
the victim?”). If participants, at any point of the interview, raised concerns about the manipulated details (e.g., “Well,
she was a bit overweight”), the experimenter first referred them to their statement. If they insisted (e.g., “This is a
mistake”), then the experimenter kept a neutral position (e.g., “If you feel there is a mistake, I will make a note and
check it later. Shall we continue with the interview?”), noted the detailed as detected, and continued with the
interview. All instances of suspicion (major and minor), if correct, were counted as concurrent detection. After the
interview, participants were asked to fill out the posttest questionnaire and were thanked and debriefed.3 | RESULTS
3.1 | Detection rates
As many participants did not report all the to‐be‐manipulated details in their original statements, we changed fewer
details than initially planned. In Experiment 1, of the 29 × 4 = 116 planned manipulations, we could only change 82
SAGANA ET AL. 325details. Of these, 61 (74.4%) were detected concurrently and 12 (14.6%) additional trials were detected retrospec-
tively, leading to 89.0% overall detection rate. In Experiment 2, we performed 108 of 160 planned manipulations.
Eighty‐one (75.0%) were detected concurrently, and 14 (13.0%) additional trials were detected retrospectively, lead-
ing to an 88.0% overall detection rate. In Experiment 3, we performed 78 of 128 planned manipulations. Twenty‐nine
(37.2%) were detected concurrently, and 13 (16.7%) additional trials were detected retrospectively, leading to 53.8%
overall detection rate. The mean detection rate across studies can be found in Figure 1 (see also Table 2). Though
overall participants' ability to detect manipulations in their written statements was higher than the typical findings
in this line of research (Christianson et al., 2007; van Bergen et al., 2010), participants missed a substantial number
of manipulations in their written statements, particularly for the longest delay.
The total number of performed manipulations (range: 1–4) did not affect the detection rates, all Fs(3, 29–40)
≤ 1.01, ps ≥ .401. Furthermore, participants seldom indicated manipulations that had not occurred. Across all three
experiments, only 23 nonmanipulated details were suspected falsely to be altered. If participants' objections
(detections) to the manipulated details reflected memory updating or imprecise writing in the original statements,
one should expect that participants would be equally likely to raise suspicion about nonmanipulated details as well.
That was not the case.
To further examine the effect of delay on detection rates, we analysed the data of all three experiments directly.
For the purpose of this analysis we included only the three manipulated details that remained constant across all
experiments (see Table 1). A standard least square regression analysis would not be appropriate for this design
because it includes categorical within‐subject response data. Rather, a regression methodology known as generalised
estimating equation (GEE) is in order. The GEE model provides an appropriate alternative as it accounts for the
correlated residuals via the specification of the working correlation matrix. This method enables the incorporation
of the repeated observations for all performed manipulations, leading to a total of N = 192 observations.
Two separate GEE analyses were performed with concurrent and overall detection rates (detected vs.
nondetected) as dependent variables and the delay and the three different manipulated details as predictors. Note
that the use of the manipulated details as predictor is exploratory. Our analysis confirmed that delay significantly
affected both concurrent, Wald χ2(2, N = 192) = 11.43, p = .003, and overall detection rates, Wald χ2(2, N = 192) = 8.97,
p = .011. Specifically, the 1‐month delay resulted in significantly lower detection rates, compared to the shorter delays
(i.e., minutes and 48 hr). The results of this statistical analysis can be found in Table 3. Interestingly, which specific
detail was manipulated had an effect on both concurrent, Wald χ2(2, N = 192) = 11.34, p = .003, and overall detection,
Wald χ2(2, N = 192) = 10.83, p = .004. The detailed results of this analysis can also be found in Table 3. Inspection ofFIGURE 1 Proportion of concurrent, retrospective, and overall detection rates as a function of delay. Error bars
represent (bootstrapped) 95% confidence intervals




n M (%) 95% CI M (%) 95% CI M (%) 95% CI
Experiment 1
(minute delay)
1 The hair of the female
bystander was red
25 80.0 55.5–94.1 6.67 4.5–25.0 86.6 66.6–94.7
2 The figure of the victim
was normal
15 55.5 32.0–80.0 22.2 5.6–42.9 77.7 57.1–94.1
3 Perpetrator pushed the
victim to the ground
24 88.0 73.6–96.5 12.0 3.6–27.0 100 n/a
4 The surrounding was a
parking lot
18 70.8 53.3–89.4 16.6 4.4–34.5 87.5 72.2–96.1
Overall 116 74.4 64.7–84.0 14.6 7.3–21.9 89.0 82.1–95.9
Experiment 2
(48‐hr delay)
1 The hair of the female
bystander was red
34 57.8 33.3–80.9 10.5 4.2–27.4 68.4 47.3–87.5
2 The figure of the victim
was normal
19 52.1 30.7–72.2 26.1 8.0–45.0 78.2 60.8–94.7
3 Perpetrator pushed the
victim to the ground
32 88.2 77.1–97.1 8.8 2.6–19.3 97.0 89.1–97.5
4 The surrounding was a
parking lot
23 87.5 75.0–96.7 9.3 2.8–21.0 96.8 89.1–97.5
Overall 108 75.0 66.7–83.2 13.0 7.4–19.4 88.0 81.7–94.1
Experiment 3
(1‐month delay)
1 The hair of the female
bystander was red
25 30.0 9.0–62.4 20.0 7.7–50.0 50.0 19.3–82.3
3 The figure of the victim
was normal
10 47.5 26.6–70.0 26.0 9.1–45.8 73.9 54.5–90.9
4 Perpetrator pushed the
victim to the ground
20 52.0 30.3–70.8 20.0 5.2–36.7 72.0 52.0–89.4
2 The bystanders walked
away with their bikes
23 10.0 4.1–25.0 0.0 n/a 10.0 4.0–26.6
Overall 78 37.2 26.2–48.1 16.7 9.0–25.6 53.8 42.5–65.1
Note. The ns refer to the total number of manipulations performed across participants. In Experiment 3, the order of the
manipulations differs because they followed the chronological sequence of the events. CI = confidence interval.
TABLE 3 Fit for predictors for generalized estimating equation models investigating whether the delay between
giving statement and being presented with manipulations and the type of the manipulated detail affect concurrent and
overall detection rates
Concurrent detection Overall detection
b SE Wald χ2 p OR b SE Wald χ2 p OR
Delay (base = min)
48 hr 0.345 .398 0.75 .387 1.41 0.527 .537 0.95 .328 1.69
1 month 1.356 .427 10.04 .002 3.89 1.500 .543 7.63 .006 4.48
Detail (base = person: hair)
Person: figure 0.166 .414 0.16 .689 1.18 −0.517 .486 1.13 .287 0.60
Action: push −1.015 .403 6.34 .012 0.36 −1.561 .484 10.39 .001 0.21
Intercept −0.838 .386 4.72 .030 0.43 −1.494 .479 9.737 .002 0.22
Note. df = 1. SE = standard error; OR = odds ratio.
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of the detail regarding the action of the perpetrator for the longest delay. The detection rates for the manipulation
regarding the hair of the bystander exhibit a linear, yet nonsignificant, decline whereas detection rates for the manip-
ulation about the figure of the victim seem to be entirely unaffected by the retention interval. Note, however, that the
inclusion of the interaction term of the retention interval and the manipulated detail in the model did not improve the
fit and yielded nonsignificant results.
FIGURE 2 Proportion of concurrent (panel a), retrospective (panel b), and overall (panel c) detection rates for the
three manipulated details that remained constant across Experiments as a function of delay. Error bars represent
(bootstrapped) 95% confidence intervals
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328 SAGANA ET AL.The low number of retrospective detections allows only a descriptive approach to the data. Visual inspection of
the mean detection rates (Figures 1 and 2) reveals that retrospective detection remained stable across the different
delays. Though this might reflect differences in memory and decision making between the instances where a manip-
ulation is detected concurrently or retrospectively, given the limited number of the observations, we cannot draw
conclusions about the effect of delay on retrospective detection.3.2 | Accuracy of witness memory
Recall accuracy of the later to‐be‐manipulated details was high in all three Experiments (Experiment 1: 97.5%;
Experiment 2: 97.1%; and Experiment 3: 98.8%). Of the six inaccurately recalled details that were manipulated, five
were detected concurrently and one was detected retrospectively. These findings suggest that the ability to detect
manipulations was not confined by the ability to accurately reproduce the witnessed details and are consistent with
earlier work on eyewitness identification decisions (Sagana, Sauerland, & Merckelbach, 2014a, 2014b, 2015).4 | DISCUSSION
In a series of three studies, we examined the ability of eyewitnesses to detect manipulations introduced to their tes-
timony. We showed that eyewitnesses miss manipulations in the specifics of a statement they had written earlier and
that the magnitude of the effect was larger for longer (1 month; Experiment 3) than for shorter delays (minutes or
48 hr; Experiments 1 and 2). For the longer delay, the results were most striking with only 36%–52% of the manipu-
lations being detected, compared with the 74%–89% detections for shorter delays (see Figure 1). Additionally, the
overall high levels of recall accuracy (97.3%–98.7%) for the to‐be‐manipulated details imply that even information that
has been encoded and recalled accurately is susceptible to covert manipulations.
Our findings replicate and expand on earlier work in that witnesses can miss errors and manipulations in their
written and spoken statements (Christianson et al., 2007; van Bergen et al., 2010). Though direct comparisons across
studies are unwarranted, on a descriptive level, our study yielded higher detection rates for longer delays than those
reposted in the studies of Christianson et al. (self‐read condition: 71.6%) and van Bergen et al. (2010; day: 55.0%;
2 weeks: 27.5%). This observation supports the idea that writing allows for strong monitoring and control of the pro-
duced information (Grabowski, 2007) and thus increases the chances of detecting manipulations in one's statement.
Nevertheless, our results also suggest that typing a statement may not be sufficient for filtering out manipulations in
one's statement after long delays (see Figures 1 and 2). The latter finding is in line with studies on the misinformation
effect, which indicate increased acceptance of misinformation for longer compared with shorter retention intervals
(Belli et al., 1992; Frost et al., 2002; Higham, 1998; Loftus, 2005; Underwood & Pezdek, 1998). Our findings are also
consistent with recent studies indicating that eyewitnesses can be unaware of covert changes in the outcome of their
identification decisions (Sagana, Sauerland, & Merckelbach, 2013, 2014b).
From a theoretical stance, our result can be explained by the SMF (for a review, see Johnson et al., 1993). The
SMF postulates that misinformation alike effects are due to individuals' struggle to discriminate between externally
and internally derived information. This struggle results in source monitoring errors. Accordingly, the failure to detect
changes in one's statement could be the result of source monitoring errors. The SMF also proposes that source mon-
itoring errors can occur because of disruptions either in memory (e.g., insufficient encoding and forgetting) or in deci-
sion making (e.g., due to heuristics and social influences). Applying the SMF logic to our findings, we assume that
because writing allows for increased input control (Grabowski, 2007) and generates additional visual records between
the event and the recall (Kellogg, 2007), written statements should generate strong memory cues. In turn, these cues
should protect participants against committing source monitoring errors when judging whether the derived informa-
tion has been generated externally (i.e., due to the manipulation) or internally (i.e., due to recollection process) and
result in increased detection rates. Indeed, looking at the detection rates for the shorter delays, this seems to be
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cues that allowed participants to successfully discriminate the source of the information fade over time, leaving par-
ticipants unable to determine the origin of the information, hence increasing misinformation acceptance. As a result,
they misattribute the source and accept the change in their statement as their own recollection. The finding that con-
current and overall detection rates decreased for the longer as compared with the shorter delays is in line with this
interpretation. The retrospective detection rate that remained stable across delays constitutes an exception to this
pattern of findings. This is likely attributable to the small number of detections in retrospect or due to ceiling effects
in detection rates in Experiments 1 and 2. Determining whether the decrease in concurrent and overall detection rates
results from disruptions in memory (e.g., forgetting the content of the original statement), decision making (e.g., reli-
ance on biases or social influences) or an interplay of the two is beyond the scope of the present investigation.
Nevertheless, considering previous results showing that participants can be fairly accurate at remembering their orig-
inal choice when their outcome of this choice was manipulated (Sagana et al., 2014a), a disrupted decision‐making
process when determining the source of the information may be a more likely explanation. For example, van Bergen
et al.'s (2010) results indicate that participants who distrust their memory are more likely to accept misinformation
than participants with positive views about their memory.
Interestingly, the current results suggest that the type of the manipulated detail might be of importance for the
ability of witnesses to detect errors in their statements. As illustrated in Figure 2, detection rates for the manipulation
concerning the figure of the victim remained moderate yet stable across the different delays, whereas the manipula-
tion regarding the hair of the bystander exhibited a linear decline. In contrast, the detection rate of the manipulation
regarding the action of the perpetrator to push the victim to the ground, which is the most noticed manipulation for
the shorter delays, showed a sudden drop for the longer delay. Drawing from Heider's attributional approach (Heider,
1958), witnesses should focus their attention on actions rather than the descriptions of targets and location details. In
line with this idea are findings indicating that witnesses do not only report more actions than descriptive details but
are also more likely to accurately remember actions than descriptive details (Clifford & Scott, 1978; Ibabe & Sporer,
2004). Moreover, the negative influence of newly acquired (mis)information on memory is weaker for details with a
strong causal and temporal context (Migueles & García‐Bajos, 2007; Myers, O'Brien, Balota, & Toyofuku, 1984).
Whereas descriptions of persons and locations can be independent pieces of information that may not be causally
related to the event or to other descriptions, details referring to actions are interconnected as one action can lead
to another. This could explain the remarkably high detection rate of the manipulation concerning the action of the per-
petrator for the shorter delays. However, if the causal, spatial, and temporal links to the action detail are disrupted,
then the memory superiority should dissipate (Burke, Heuer, & Reisberg, 1992) and the detection advantage for
details regarding actions should be undermined. One way to disrupt the aforementioned links is to increase the reten-
tion interval as increased delays weaken the memory. This appears to be the case for the 1‐month delay where the
greatest decline in detection rates refers to the action detail: The longer delay appears to have disrupted the memory
of the event. Undoubtedly, additional factors may moderate the effect as details are unlikely to differ only in one
aspect. They differ in valence, memorability, and semantic relatedness, all of which can influence memory (Dolcos,
LaBar, & Cabeza, 2005; Jacques & Levine, 2007; LaBar & Cabeza, 2006; Talmi & Moscovitch, 2004). Therefore, on
the basis of the present exploratory findings, we cannot draw firm conclusions about the effect of specific detail types
on detection. Yet our results suggest that this topic requires systematic investigation.
Turning to the practical relevance of the present work, our findings are pertinent to law enforcement agencies
and legal professionals. Mistaken or deliberate manipulations even of minor details can impede the accurate recon-
struction of an event and possibly incriminate innocent suspects. Importantly, the present work speaks to the risk
of long delays between police investigation and court trials. Considering that even under the speedy trial act, as
applied in the U.S. judicial system, trials begin at least 90–120 days after the arrest of the suspect (Shermer, Rose,
& Hoffman, 2011), the increasing acceptance of manipulations with longer delays is of concern. The current findings
suggest that by the time witnesses would be cross‐examined in court, a large proportion of witnesses would fail to
realise that their statement has been tampered with. Furthermore, our work indicates that writing a statement comes
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issues emerging from our line of work directly appeal to the importance for triers of fact to check for the consistency
between witness statements and video recordings of witness interviews.
In conclusion, in a series of three experiments, we showed that eyewitnesses can be unaware of errors introduced
in their written statements, with the effect being more pronounced for longer than shorter delays. Future research
should look systematically into the factors that underlie poor detection of manipulations. The current findings, along
with earlier work on the fallibility of autobiographical memory (Barclay & Wellman, 1986; Merckelbach et al., 1997),
show how easy it is to compromise the quality of eyewitness statements and call for further research in this area.
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